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Social versus Private Insurance
Social Insurance Private Insurance
Compulsory Voluntary
Social minimum income replaced Amounts dependent on willingness to pay
Provide socially adequate benefits Emphasis on individual equity
Benefits prescribed by law Benefits established by legal contract
Government monopoly Competition
Costs difficult to predict Costs actuarially predictable
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Emergence of UI
• Widespread hardship in the 1930s made public 
relief palatable
• Involuntary unemployment was recognized as 
an unavoidable risk
• Economic loss from unemployment establishes 
a presumed need
• Unemployment insurance (UI) was regarded as 
superior to relief for experienced workers
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Economic Rationale for UI
Market failure—private UI markets would collapse
• Low risk pools–profitable 
• High risk pools–uninsurable 
– Would generate a social assistance problem
UI as a public good
• Reduces unemployed becoming a social burden
• An automatic stabilizer for the macroeconomy
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UI in Social Security Act of 1935
• Established federal-state UI under Title III where 
states administer programs under state rules
• Federal tax incentive for state UI laws
– Employer tax reduced by 90% in conforming states
• Title IX established Unemployment Trust Fund 
and Employment Security Admin Account
• Title XII provides crisis loans to states for UI
• Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 1939
– Title IX taxing provision moved to Internal Revenue 










Original UI Policy Goals
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• Partial income replacement during unemployment
• Prevent descent into poverty
• Automatic stabilizer for the macroeconomy
• Maintain employer attachments through benefits
• Reduce layoffs through experience rating of taxes
• Promote reemployment via required work search 
(work test) and employment services
• Finance through independent reserves with benefits 
equal to tax contributions over business cycles 
Restoring UI
• Eligibility – recipiency has declined
• Benefits – wage replacement rates have fallen
• Forward financing – has deteriorated
• Experience rating – is less effective
• Automatic stabilizer – is weaker
• Extended benefits – are not automatic
• Reemployment initiatives – are not available in 
all states Work Sharing and Self-Employment
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Regular UI Recipients and Layoffs as Shares of the Unemployed, 1980-2017
Recipiency rate Layoff-rate Linear (Recipiency rate) Linear (Layoff-rate)
Suggested Eligibility Rules
• Involuntarily unemployed
• Actively seeking work
• Attached to the labor force – accessible threshold
– High quarter earnings at least $1,000
– Base period earnings >= 1.5*HQE = $1,500
• Base period 4 of previous 4 or 5 quarters (ABP)
• If usually full- or part-time and seeking same
• Allow personal and family good cause quits 








































Regular UI Recipiency and Wage Replacement Rates in the United States, 1980-2017
Recipiency rate (left scale) Replacement rate






































Average Potential Weeks Duration of Regular UI and the Share of Total Unemployed 
who are Jobless for 27 Weeks or Longer in the United States, 1971-2017
Potential duration Long-term unemployed share Linear (Potential duration) Linear (Long-term unemployed share)
Partial Income Replacement
• Socially adequate benefits while involuntarily 
unemployed and seeking work.
• Proposed reforms:
– Replace half of lost earnings between limits.
• Minimum at a higher replacement rate.
• Maximum at two-thirds average weekly wage in state.




States That Reduced the Maximum Duration of Unemployment Insurance Benefits to 
Fewer Than 26 Weeks Since 2011
State









Arkansas 26 9-16 2011
Florida 26 12-23 (12) 2011
Georgia 26 6-20 (14) 2012
Illinois* 26 25 (26) 2012
Kansas 26 16-26 2013
Michigan 26 20 2012
Missouri 26 8-20 2011
North Carolina 26 12-20 2013
South Carolina 26 13-20 2011
Source: DOL, Comparison of State Unemployment Laws, selected years, and GAO analysis of relevant 
state laws. | GAO-15-281.   *Illinois 25 week maximum duration effective only in 2012.
Automatic Macroeconomy Stabilizer
• When unemployment rises UI injects spending 
to consumers with high propensities to spend.
• As unemployment falls reserves are rebuilt.
• UI income multiplier estimate 2.5 over prior 6 
recessions (Chimerine et al. USDOL 1999).
• Regular UI eroded; EB triggers ineffective.
• Forward funding is insufficient.






Benefit levels and durations rose and 
declined with financing adequacy
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State  Maximum 
Durations
Waiting Weeks Taxable Wages Avg. Tax Rates
Year LE16 GE 26 Low High Low High Total Taxable
1936 100% 100% 0.90 0.90
1937 100% 100% 1.80 1.80
1938 100% 100% 2.70 2.70
1939 43 0 2 4 3,000 3,000 2.66 2.72
1959 0 51 0 1 3,000 4,200 1.06 1.71
1979 0 51 0 1 6,000 11,200 1.26 2.67
1999 0 51 0 1 7,000 27,500 0.56 1.77
2012 2 46 0 1 7,000 38,800 0.90 3.40
2014 2 45 0 1 7,000 41,300 0.79 2.95
2018 3 45 0 1 7,000 47,300 0.58 2.21
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y = -6E-05x + 0.0116







UI Taxes and Benefits as shares of Total Wages 
in the United States, 1946-2016
Taxes Benefits Linear (Taxes) Linear (Benefits)





































UI and Social Security taxable wage bases and the ratio of total to UI taxable wages, 1937-2017 
SS-Taxable Wage Base UI-Taxable Wage Base Tax/total ratio
(UI taxable wages/total wages)
Restore Forward Funding
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Index the FUTA taxable wage base
• The FUTA base is the minimum for states
• Recommendation: peg the FUTA wage base to a 
proportion of the Social Security tax base
Average High Cost Multiple (years of recession 
level benefits in state reserves) target is 1.0
• Raise state Average High Cost Multiples
– Reward: Pay higher rates if AHCM > 1.0






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SUMMARY OF STATE TRUST FUND STATUS
AVERAGE HIGH COST MULTIPLE AS OF 1/1/2018
Recommended Minimum
Adequate Solvency Level































Recession following year-end 2017 levels
Number of States that Would have Negative UI Reserves after a Recession Trough if a 
Mild, Average, or Severe Recession Followed peak Reserves in 2017  
Negative reserve states
CA, CT, DE, IL, IN, MA, 
MO, NJ, NY, OH, PA, 
TX, VI
Mild recession
states plus AZ, 
CO, KY, MI, MN, 
RI, SC, WV, WI
All prior 22 states 
plus Nevada (NV)
Employer Attachment – Avoid Layoffs
• Experience rating of employer UI taxes is 
intended to discourage layoffs
• Research shows experience rating reduces 
layoffs if tax rates respond to layoffs
• Many states have few rates and often cluster 
employers at low minimum and maximums
• Require at least 10 rates and prohibit zero
• Work sharing is available in 29 states, but 
should be an employer option in all states
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Enhance Employer Attachment
Renew the Employment Service
• The Employment Service (ES) administers the UI 
work test and provides reemployment services
• ES has statutory Wagner-Peyser Act funding but 
has had inadequate appropriations for decades
• Reemployment Services and Eligibility 
Assessments (RESEA) are not a substitute for ES
• RESEA has depended on inconsistent funding and 























Wagner-Peyser Funding for Employment Services 
in Nominal and Real Dollars (1984=100)
Nominal Real Linear (Nominal) Linear (Real)
Reform Extended Benefits
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• States should provide potential durations of at least 
26 weeks regular UI regardless of the TUR level. 
• The Extended Benefits (EB) program should have 
TUR triggers that extend durations in crises.
• EB should be 100 percent federally financed from 
ESAA, and if necessary, from general revenues.
• Congress may exercise discretion to provide 
emergency extended benefits on top of regular UI and 
the permanent EB program.
Summary of Reforms
• Improve benefit access
• Improve benefit amounts and duration
• Improve forward funding
• Institute TUR triggers for EB along with 100% 
federal financing 
• Fund ES and RESEA for return to work
• Improve state WPRS profiling models
• Universal access to Work Sharing and SEA
• Allow states to offer reemployment bonuses
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